Nie ma wersji polskiej
Steen Ejerskov
- 29 October 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 399Details
- Abstract
- In certain market environments, a large investor may benefit from building up a futures position first and trading subsequently in the spot market (Kumar and Seppi, 1992). The present paper identifies a variation of this type of manipulation that might occur in money markets with an interest rate corridor. We show that manipulation involving the use of central bank facilities would be observable only sporadically. The probability of manipulation decreases when the central bank uses an active liquidity management. Manipulation can also be reduced by widening the interest rate corridor.
- JEL Code
- D84 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Expectations, Speculations
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 27 July 2004
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 378Details
- Abstract
- We model the interbank market for overnight credit with heterogeneous banks and asymmetric information. An unsophisticated bank just trades to compensate its liquidity imbalance, while a sophisticated bank will exploit its private information about the liquidity situation in the market. It is shown that with positive probability, the liquidity effect (Hamilton, 1997) is reversed, i.e., a liquidity drainage from the banking system may generate an overall decrease in the market rate. The phenomenon does not disappear when the number of banks increases. We also show that private information mitigates the effect of an unexpected liquidity shock on the market rate, suggesting a conservative information policy from a central bank perspective.
- JEL Code
- G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 23 December 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 295Details
- Abstract
- On several occasions during the period 2001-2003, the European Central Bank (ECB) decided to deviate from its "neutral" benchmark allotment rule, with the effect of not alleviating a temporary liquidity shortage in the banking system. This is remarkable because it implied the possibility of short-term interest rates raising significantly above the main policy rate. In the present paper, we show that when the monetary authority cares for both liquidity and interest rate conditions, the optimal allotment policy may entail a discontinuous reaction to initial conditions. More precisely, we prove that there is a threshold level for the accumulated aggregate liquidity position in the banking system prior to the last operation in a given maintenance period, so that the benchmark allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are above the threshold, and a tight allotment is optimal whenever liquidity conditions are below the threshold.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
- 1 July 2003
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 244Details
- Abstract
- This model provides a simple weekly model of the regular supply of liquidity in the euro area, with a view to understanding the functioning of the euro area money market. The main result of the analysis is that liquidity has normally been provided by the ECB in a neutral and smooth manner, but also that there has been attempt, albeit very limited, to correct deviations of the overnight rate from the main refinancing rate. Moreover, the paper finds that liquidity has affected the overnight interest rate to a significant extent only after the last main refinancing operation of the maintenance period, when it is not possible for the ECB to adjust liquidity imbalances except by making recourse to fine-tuning operations.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages