Não disponível em português
Laura-Dona Capotă
- 14 November 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2747Details
- Abstract
- Funds with an environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) mandate have been growing rapidly in recent years and received inflows also during periods of market turmoil, such as March 2020, in contrast to their non-ESG peers. This paper investigates whether investors in ESG funds react differently to past negative performance, making these funds less sensitive to short-term changes in returns. In the absence of an ESG-label, we define an ESG- or Environmentally-focused fund if its name contains relevant words. The results show that ESG/E equity and corporate bond funds exhibit a weaker flow-performance relationship compared to traditional funds in 2016-2020. This finding may reflect the longer-term investment horizon of ESG investors and their expectation of better risk-adjusted performance from ESG funds in the future. We also explore how the results vary across institutional and retail investors and how they depend on the liquidity of funds’ assets and wider market conditions. A weaker flow-performance relationship allows funds to provide a stable source of financing to the green transition and may reduce risks for financial stability, particularly during turmoil episodes.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
Q56 : Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics, Environmental and Ecological Economics→Environmental Economics→Environment and Development, Environment and Trade, Sustainability, Environmental Accounts and Accounting, Environmental Equity, Population Growth
C58 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Financial Econometrics
- 5 October 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2737Details
- Abstract
- The market turmoil in March 2020 highlighted key vulnerabilities in the EU money market fund (MMF) sector. This paper assesses the effectiveness of the EU's regulatory framework from a financial stability perspective, based on a panel analysis of EU MMFs at a daily frequency. First, we find that investment in private debt assets exposes MMFs to liquidity risk. Second, we find that low volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds, which invest in non-public debt assets while offering a stable NAV, face higher redemptions than other fund types. The risk of breaching the regulatory NAV limit may have incentivised outflows among some LVNAV investors in March 2020. Third, MMFs with lower levels of liquidity buffers use their buffers less than other funds, suggesting low levels of buffer usability in stress periods. Our findings suggest fragility in the EU MMF sector and call for a strengthened regulatory framework of private debt MMFs.
- JEL Code
- G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
- 12 April 2021
- MACROPRUDENTIAL BULLETIN - ARTICLE - No. 12Details
- Abstract
- The turmoil seen in March 2020 highlighted key vulnerabilities in the money market fund (MMF) sector. This article assesses the effectiveness of the EU’s regulatory framework from a financial stability perspective and identifies three important lessons. First, investment in non-public debt assets exposes MMFs to liquidity risk, highlighting the need to limit investment in illiquid assets. Second, low-volatility net asset value (LVNAV) funds are particularly vulnerable to liquidity shocks, given that they invest in non-public debt assets while offering a stable net asset value (NAV). Enhanced portfolio requirements could strengthen their liquidity profile. And third, MMFs seem reluctant to draw down on their liquidity buffers during periods of stress, suggesting a need to make buffers more usable.
- JEL Code
- G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises