Δεν διατίθεται στα ελληνικά.
Ilya A. Strebulaev
- 1 July 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 157Details
- Abstract
- We study bidder bahavior and performance in 53 main refinancing operations (repo auctions) of the European Central Bank (ECB). The data set starts with the first auctions after the ECB changed from fixed rate tenders to variable rate tenders. We find that private information and the winnner's curse are not important in these auctions. The minimum bid rate and the level of secondary market rates play a crucial role in bidder behavior and auction performance. We also document that large bidders do better than small bidders, apparently because they use 'smarter' strategies which involve using more bids and having more kurtosis in their individual bid distribution. The penultimate auction in every reserve maintenance period has less underpricing that the other auctions within the maintenance period. Finally, from the two cases of underbidding covered by the sample period, it appears this was driven by particularly large cutrback by large, rather than small, bidders
- JEL Code
- G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
D44 : Microeconomics→Market Structure and Pricing→Auctions
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General