Níl an t-ábhar seo ar fáil i nGaeilge.
Christophe Kamps
Monetary Policy
- Current Position
-
Deputy Director General
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Public Economics,Mathematical and Quantitative Methods
- Education
- 2004
PhD in Economics, University of Kiel, Germany
- 1999
Master in Economics, University of Cologne, Germany
- 1997
Master in International Economics, University of Paris IX-Dauphine, France
- Professional experience
- 2022-
Deputy Director General - Directorate General Monetary Policy, European Central Bank
- 2021-2022
Senior Adviser - Directorate General Monetary Policy, European Central Bank
- 2020-2021
Senior Adviser (Head of Project Office for the ECB's Monetary Policy Strategy Review) - Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2016-2020
Head of Fiscal Policies Division - Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2012-2016
Head of Fiscal Surveillance Section - Fiscal Policies Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2010-2012
Principal Economist - Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2008-2010
Senior Economist - Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2005-2008
Economist - Fiscal Policies Division, Directorate General Economics, European Central Bank
- 2004-2005
Consultant - European Investment Bank
- 1999-2005
Economist - Business Cycle Analysis Department, Kiel Institute for the World Economy
- 2002
Summer Intern - Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund
- 1997
Intern - Economics Department, Deutsche Bundesbank
- Awards
- 2004
Erich Schneider prize for PhD thesis, Department of Economics, University of Kiel
- Teaching experience
- 2005
Numerical Methods in Macroeconomics, lecture in the PhD programme "Quantitative Economics", University of Kiel
- 22 May 2024
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- E40 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→General
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E50 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→General
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
- 18 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2715Details
- Abstract
- We analyse the effectiveness of optimal simple and implementable monetary and fiscal policy rules in stabilising economic activity, inflation and government debt in face of an occasionally binding lower bound on the nominal interest rate in a New Keynesian model. We show that, within the traditional assignment of active monetary policy and passive fiscal policy, the optimal fiscal policy rule features a strong counter-cyclical response to the deviation of inflation from the central bank’s target - providing significant macroeconomic stabilisation especially at the lower bound - while also featuring a strong response to government debt. Our quantitative results show that the optimal counter-cyclical fiscal feedback to inflation significantly improves welfare and reduces the lower-bound frequency. In addition, the optimal simple monetary and fiscal rules almost completely resolve the deflationary bias associated with the lower bound.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
- 10 August 2022
- THE ECB BLOGDetails
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
Related- 24 August 2022
- THE ECB BLOG
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 273Details
- Abstract
- The last review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003 followed a period of predominantly upside risks to price stability. Experience following the 2008 financial crisis has focused renewed attention on the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should best interact, in particular in an environment of structurally low interest rates and persistent downside risks to price stability. This debate has been further intensified by the economic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. In the euro area, the unique architecture of a monetary union consisting of sovereign Member States, with cross-country heterogeneities and weaknesses in its overall construction, poses important challenges. Against this background, this report revisits monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area from a monetary policy perspective and with a focus on the ramifications for price stability and maintaining central bank independence and credibility. The report consists of three parts. The first chapter presents a conceptual framework for thinking about monetary-fiscal policy interactions, thereby setting the stage for a discussion of specifically euro area aspects and challenges in subsequent parts of the report. In particular, it reviews the main ingredients of the pre-global financial crisis consensus on monetary-fiscal policy interactions and addresses significant new insights and refinements which have gained prominence since 2003. In doing so, the chapter distinguishes between general conceptual aspects – i.e. those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and a single fiscal authority and those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and many fiscal authorities (a multi-country monetary union). ...
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- 4 March 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2379Details
- Abstract
- This paper is linked to two debates on fiscal policies: first, the implications of low interest-growth differentials for debt sustainability and, second, the reform of the EU fiscal governance framework. In both debates the choice of government debt anchor and the speed of adjustment take centre stage. The Stability and Growth Pact's debt rule appears predestined to fulfil the role of debt anchor. However, our analysis shows that its existing design gives rise to a pro-cyclical bias that has hampered its implementation in the low-growth low-inflation environment. We propose two parametric changes to better balance the objectives of macroeconomic stabilisation and debt sustainability: first, accounting for persistent deviations of inflation from the central bank's objective; and, second, a reduced speed of adjustment. Putting a reformed debt rule at the centre of the EU fiscal governance framework would allow reducing the latter's complexity without the need to revise the EU Treaties.
- JEL Code
- E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
H61 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Budget, Budget Systems
H62 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Deficit, Surplus
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
H87 : Public Economics→Miscellaneous Issues→International Fiscal Issues, International Public Goods
- 30 August 2019
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 231Details
- Abstract
- This paper reviews developments in fiscal rules in the European Union (EU) from the entering into force of the Treaty on European Union (the “Maastricht Treaty”), which laid the foundations for the euro, until today. It seems safe to say that fiscal positions in the EU and the euro area are now more favourable than they would have been in the absence of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). However, the aggregate picture masks significant cross-country heterogeneity, with less progress where it would be needed most. Furthermore, the design of the rules has not always followed economic logic and has often been the product of political constraints, giving rise to some flaws in the framework from the outset. Repeated attempts to adjust the fiscal framework to a multitude of circumstances over the past 25 years have made it overly complex and incoherent. The paper concludes that, in its current shape, the SGP is an insufficient disciplining device in economic good times, with the consequence that there are no fiscal buffers, particularly in high-debt countries, to support growth in economic troughs. This, together with the absence of a central fiscal stabilisation instrument, puts the burden of stabilisation mostly on the single monetary policy. The paper also reviews reform options on how to render the fiscal framework more effective in bringing about sounder public finances and avoiding the procyclicality observed over the past two decades.
- JEL Code
- H11 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H50 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies→General
H6 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
- 5 September 2018
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 49Details
- Abstract
- Economists often try to forecast whether the economy as a whole will grow or contract. When measuring the effects of fiscal policy measures on economic activity, such forecasts are based on so-called multipliers. Using a new dataset compiled from economic forecasts and recommendations by the European Commission under the excessive deficit procedure of the Stability and Growth Pact, we derive the multipliers that were assumed by forecasters during the European sovereign debt crisis to project the effects of fiscal consolidation on economic growth. Our results confirm that forecasters adapted their assumptions on multipliers as the crisis progressed and accounted for larger effects of consolidation on growth later on in the crisis. Another finding is that the actual fiscal multipliers were not exceptionally large during the crisis.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H20 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue→General
H5 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- 30 May 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2154Details
- Abstract
- Identifying fiscal multipliers is usually constrained by the absence of a counterfactual scenario. Our new data set allows overcoming this problem by making use of the fact that recommendations under the EU’s excessive deficit procedure (EDP) provide both a baseline no-policy-change scenario and a fiscal-adjustment EDP scenario that entails a forecast of the macroeconomic impact of fiscal consolidation over the EDP horizon. For a sample of 24 EU countries to which 48 EDP recommendations were applied between 2009 and 2015, we derive country-specific fiscal multipliers as actually applied by forecasters during the crisis. Our results confirm Blanchard and Leigh’s (2013, 2014) presumption that forecasters learned during the crisis. According to our findings, fiscal multipliers as applied by the European Commission increased over time – from about 1/4 in the early years of the crisis to about 2/3 in the later years. However, different from Blanchard and Leigh (2013, 2014), we do not find evidence for the hypothesis that ex-post fiscal multipliers have been substantially above 1 during the crisis.
- JEL Code
- E32 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Business Fluctuations, Cycles
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H20 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue→General
H5 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- 19 November 2014
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 157Details
- Abstract
- In the light of the lessons learned from the euro area sovereign debt crisis, the EU fiscal and macroeconomic governance framework was overhauled in 2011. Against this background, this paper analyses whether the broadened surveillance of fiscal and macroeconomic indicators under the strengthened governance framework would have facilitated the identification of emerging imbalances, had it been in place before the crisis. The findings suggest that the strengthened governance framework would have given earlier signals about emerging excessive fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances. Euro area countries thus would have been obliged to take preventive and corrective action at an earlier stage, provided that the stricter rules had been effectively implemented. At the same time, the paper concludes that the increased reliance of the EU fiscal governance framework on unobservable magnitudes such as the structural budget balance, which are difficult to measure in real time, will continue to impede the timely identification of underlying fiscal imbalances. It is suggested that the new macroeconomic imbalance procedure could have given earlier indications about the emergence of excessive macroeconomic imbalances, which in turn posed risks for fiscal sustainability. Looking forward, these preliminary findings suggest possible synergies between the, until now largely unrelated, fiscal and macroeconomic governance frameworks.
- JEL Code
- H3 : Public Economics→Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
H6 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
E02 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General→Institutions and the Macroeconomy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
- 25 February 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1015Details
- Abstract
- To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first systematic study of the predictive power of monetary aggregates for future inflation for the cross section of New EU Member States. This paper provides stylized facts on monetary versus non-monetary (economic and fiscal) determinants of inflation in these countries as well as formal econometric evidence on the forecast performance of a large set of monetary and nonmonetary indicators. The forecast evaluation results suggest that, as has been found for other countries before, it is difficult to find models that significantly outperform a simple benchmark, especially at short forecast horizons. Nevertheless, monetary indicators are found to contain useful information for predicting inflation at longer (3-year) horizons.
- JEL Code
- C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
P24 : Economic Systems→Socialist Systems and Transitional Economies→National Income, Product, and Expenditure, Money, Inflation
- 31 March 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 877Details
- Abstract
- The empirical literature using vector autoregressive models to assess the effects of fiscal policy shocks strongly disagrees on even the qualitative response of key macroeconomic variables to government spending and tax shocks. We provide new evidence for the U.S. over the period 1955-2006. We show that, controlling for differences in specification of the reduced-form model, all identification approaches used in the literature yield qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results as regards government spending shocks. In response to such shocks real GDP, real private consumption and the real wage all significantly increase following a hump-shaped pattern, while private employment does not react. In contrast, we find strongly diverging results as regards the effects of tax shocks, with the estimated effects ranging from non-distortionary to strongly distortionary. The di¤erences in results can to a large extent be traced back to differences in the size of automatic stabilizers estimated or calibrated for alternative identification approaches. These differences also translate into uncertainty about the effects of policy experiments typically considered in theoretical models.
- JEL Code
- C32 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Time-Series Models, Dynamic Quantile Regressions, Dynamic Treatment Effect Models, Diffusion Processes
E60 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→General
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
H20 : Public Economics→Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue→General
H5 : Public Economics→National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
- 2023
- Fernando Fernández Méndez de Andés (ed.) (2023), "The Union in a fragmented world: a yearbook on the euro in 2023", Fundación Instituto Español de Analistas and Fundación ICO, Madrid
- 2022
- European Journal of Political Economy
- 2022
- Bank of Israel (2022), The inflation target in Israel - past, present and future
- 2020
- Economic Policy
- 2019
- Journal of Economics and Statistics
- 2017
- Review of Economic Studies
- 2017
- Intereconomics
- 2009
- Intereconomics
- 2006
- Empirica
- 2006
- IMF Staff Papers
- 2005
- International Tax and Public Finance
- 2005
- EIB Papers
- 2004
- Springer