Nie ma wersji polskiej
Beata K. Bierut
- 16 July 2009
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1070Details
- Abstract
- Monetary Policy Committees differ in the way the interest rate proposal is prepared and presented in the policy meeting. In this paper we show analytically how different arrangements could affect the voting behaviour of individual MPC members and therefore policy outcomes. We then apply our results to the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. A general finding is that when MPC members are not too diverse in terms of expertise and experience, policy discussions should not be based on pre- prepared policy options. Instead, interest rate proposals should arise endogenously as a majority of views expressed by the members, as is the case at the Bank of England and appears to be the case in the FOMC under Chairman Bernanke.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
D71 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Social Choice, Clubs, Committees, Associations
D78 : Microeconomics→Analysis of Collective Decision-Making→Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation