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Tilman Bletzinger
Monetary Policy
- Division
Monetary Policy Strategy
- Current Position
-
Lead Economist
- Fields of interest
-
Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,Financial Economics
- Education
- 2014-2018
Doctorate in Economics, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- 2011-2014
Master in Quantitative Economics, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- 2008-2011
Bachelor in Economics, Maastricht University, the Netherlands & University of California, Los Angeles, USA
- Professional experience
- 2023-
Lead Economist - Monetary Policy Strategy Division, Directorate General Monetary Policy, ECB
- 2019-2023
(Lead/Senior) Economist - Capital Markets/Financial Structure Division, Directorate General Monetary Policy, ECB
- 2016-2019
Economist - Risk Strategy Division, Directorate Risk Management, ECB
- 2012-2016
Research assistant - Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- Teaching experience
- 2012-2016
Monetary and Fiscal Policy - Graduate School, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
- 2009-2010
Quantitative Methods - School of Business and Economics, Maastricht University, the Netherlands
- 16 January 2023
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 103Details
- Abstract
- A safe asset is of high credit quality, retains its value in bad times and is traded in liquid markets. We show that bonds issued by the European Union (EU) are widely considered to be of high credit quality, and that their yield spread over German Bunds remained contained during the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic recession. Recent issuances under the EU’s SURE and NGEU initiatives helped improve EU bonds' market liquidity from previously low levels, also reducing liquidity risk premia. Eurosystem purchases and holdings of EU bonds did not impair market liquidity. Currently, one obstacle to EU bonds achieving a genuine euro-denominated safe asset status, approaching that of Bunds, lies in the one-off, time-limited nature of the EU’s COVID-19-related policy responses.
- JEL Code
- G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 16 August 2022
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2712Details
- Abstract
- A safe asset is of high credit quality, retains its value in bad times, and is traded in liquid markets. We show that bonds issued by the European Union (EU) are widely considered to be of high credit quality, and that their yield spread over German Bunds remained contained during the 2020 Covid-19 pandemic recession. Recent issuances and taps under the EU’s SURE and NGEU initiatives helped improve EU bonds' market liquidity from previously low levels, also reducing liquidity risk premia. Eurosystem purchases and holdings of EU bonds did not impair market liquidity. Currently, one obstacle to EU bonds achieving a genuine euro-denominated safe asset status, approaching that of Bunds, lies in the one-off, time-limited nature of the EU’s Covid-19-related policy responses.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt
- 21 September 2021
- OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 273Details
- Abstract
- The last review of the ECB’s monetary policy strategy in 2003 followed a period of predominantly upside risks to price stability. Experience following the 2008 financial crisis has focused renewed attention on the question of how monetary and fiscal policy should best interact, in particular in an environment of structurally low interest rates and persistent downside risks to price stability. This debate has been further intensified by the economic impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic. In the euro area, the unique architecture of a monetary union consisting of sovereign Member States, with cross-country heterogeneities and weaknesses in its overall construction, poses important challenges. Against this background, this report revisits monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area from a monetary policy perspective and with a focus on the ramifications for price stability and maintaining central bank independence and credibility. The report consists of three parts. The first chapter presents a conceptual framework for thinking about monetary-fiscal policy interactions, thereby setting the stage for a discussion of specifically euro area aspects and challenges in subsequent parts of the report. In particular, it reviews the main ingredients of the pre-global financial crisis consensus on monetary-fiscal policy interactions and addresses significant new insights and refinements which have gained prominence since 2003. In doing so, the chapter distinguishes between general conceptual aspects – i.e. those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and a single fiscal authority and those aspects that pertain to an environment characterised by a single central bank and many fiscal authorities (a multi-country monetary union). ...
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
F45 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- 26 June 2018
- RESEARCH BULLETIN - No. 47Details
- Abstract
- In response to the global financial crisis the central banks of many advanced economies have adopted large-scale asset purchase programmes, with particular prominence given to purchases of sovereign debt. These programmes – often labelled as quantitative easing or QE – are intended to overcome the lower-bound constraint on short-term interest rates in an environment of persistently low inflation rates. This article offers a conceptual perspective on a number of design issues of QE that are specific to monetary unions. In general, design options for QE depend on the degree of institutional completeness of a monetary union. This is illustrated with findings from a stylised model of a monetary union which assumes an environment in which the central bank can always be assured that national fiscal policies are sustainable. Such setting is conducive to a particularly effective design of QE.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
- 5 June 2018
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2156Details
- Abstract
- This paper develops a tractable model of a monetary union with a sound fiscal governance structure and shows how in such environment the design of monetary policy above and at the lower bound constraint on short-term interest rates can be linked to well-known findings from the literature dealing with single closed economies. The model adds a portfolio balance channel to a New Keynesian two-country model of a monetary union. If the monetary union is symmetric and the portfolio balance channel is not active, the model becomes isomorphic to the canonical New Keynesian three-equation economy in which central bank purchases of long-term debt (QE) at the lower bound are ineffective. If the portfolio balance channel is active, QE becomes effective and we prove that for sufficiently small shocks there exists an interest rate rule augmented by QE at the lower bound which replicates the equilibrium allocation and the welfare level of a hypothetically unconstrained economy. Shocks large enough to push the whole yield curve to the lower bound require, in addition, forward guidance. We generalise these results to an asymmetric monetary union and illustrate them through simulations, distinguishing between asymmetric shocks and asymmetric structures. In general, asymmetries give rise to current account imbalances which are, depending on the degree of financial integration, funded by private capital imports or through the central bank balance sheet channel. Moreover, our findings support that at the lower bound, as long as asymmetries between countries result from shocks, outcomes under an unconstrained policy rule can be replicated via a symmetric QE design. By contrast, asymmetric structures of the countries which matter for the transmission of monetary policy can translate into an asymmetric QE design.
- JEL Code
- E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E61 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Policy Objectives, Policy Designs and Consistency, Policy Coordination
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
- 10 February 2017
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2019Details
- Abstract
- This paper uses two established DSGE models (QUEST III and Smets-Wouters) to assess the impact of fiscal spending cuts on output and, in particular, also on inflation in the euro area under alternative settings for monetary policy. We compare four different settings of constrained monetary policy, taking into account alternative agents’ expectations about future monetary policy. We illustrate that those expectations are even more important for the size of the fiscal multipliers than the difference between exogenously versus endogenously modelled constraints. We confirm the well-known finding that fiscal multipliers exhibit an over-proportional reaction when monetary policy is constrained. The novelty of our results is that this over-proportionality is stronger for the fiscal multiplier on inflation than on output. We relate this finding to the structural parameters of the models by means of a Global Sensitivity Analysis.
- JEL Code
- E31 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Price Level, Inflation, Deflation
E43 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
- 2022
- Journal of Risk and Financial Management
- 2021
- European Economic Review
- 2017
- Data in Brief
- 2017
- Economics Letters