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Mark Hallerberg

1 December 2004
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 419
The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries
English
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Abstract
This paper examines the development of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries, and their impact of public finances since the mid-1980s. It presents a new data set on institutional reforms and their impact in Europe. Empirical pattern confirm our prediction that more stringent fiscal rules exist under large coalition governments, while the centralisation of budgetary procedures is the main form of fiscal governance elsewhere. In addition, the centralisation of procedures does not restrain public debt in countries more prone to a rules-based approach, whereas more stringent fiscal rules seem to support fiscal discipline in almost all EU countries.
JEL Code
H11 : Public Economics→Structure and Scope of Government→Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
H61 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Budget, Budget Systems
H62 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Deficit, Surplus
16 February 2004
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 307
Budgetary forecasts in Europe - the track record of stability and convergence programmes
English
Details
Abstract
We analyse the performance of budgetary and growth forecasts of all stability and convergence programmes submitted by EU member states over the last decade. Differences emerge for the bias in budgetary projections across countries. As a second step we explore whether economic, political and institutional factors can explain this pattern. Our analysis indicates that the cyclical position and the form of fiscal governance are major determinants of forecast biases. Projected changes in the budgetary position are mainly affected by the cycle, the need of convergence before EMU and by electoral cycles.
JEL Code
C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
E17 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General Aggregative Models→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
H62 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Deficit, Surplus