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Hubert Kempf
- 31 March 2008
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 880Details
- Abstract
- This paper offers a framework to study commitment and cooperation issues in games with multiple policymakers. To reconcile some puzzles in the recent literature on the nature of policy interactions among nations, we prove that games characterized by different commitment and cooperation schemes can admit the same equilibrium outcome if certain spillover effects vanish at the common solution of these games. We provide a detailed discussion of these spillovers, showing that, in general, commitment and cooperation are non-trivial issues. Yet, in linear-quadratic models with multiple policymakers commitment and cooperation schemes are shown to become irrelevant under certain assumptions. The framework is suficiently general to cover a broad range of results from the recent literature on policy interactions as special cases, both within monetary unions and among fully sovereign nations.
- JEL Code
- E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
E63 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Stabilization, Treasury Policy
- 1 September 2002
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 175Details
- Abstract
- In this paper, we consider the effect of a monetary union in a model with a significant role for financial market imperfections. We do so by introducing a financial accelerator into a stochastic general equilibrium model of a two country economy. We show that financial market imperfections introduce important cross-country transmission mechanisms to asymmetric shocks to supply and demand. Within this framework, we study the likely costs and benefits of monetary union. We also consider the effects of cross-country heterogeneity in financial markets. Both the presence of financial frictions and the use of a single currency have significant impacts on the international propagation of exogenous shocks. The introduction of asymmetries in the financial contract widens the differences in cyclical behavior of national economies in a monetary union, but financial integration compensates the loss of policy instruments.
- JEL Code
- E0 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→General
E5 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
F0 : International Economics→General - Network
- International research forum on monetary policy