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Gerardo Ferrara

15 November 2018
WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 86
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Abstract
We study systemic illiquidity using a unique dataset on banks’ daily cash flows, short-term interbank funding and liquid asset buffers. Failure to roll-over short-term funding or repay obligations when they fall due generates an externality in the form of systemic illiquidity. We simulate a model in which systemic illiquidity propagates in the interbank funding network over multiple days. In this setting, systemic illiquidity is minimised by a macroprudential policy that skews the distribution of liquid assets towards banks that are important in the network.
JEL Code
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

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