Ei ole eesti keeles kättesaadav
Frederik Eidam
- 1 September 2020
- WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 110Details
- Abstract
- Do governments strategically choose debt maturity to fill supply gaps across maturities? Building on a new panel data set of more than 9,000 individual Eurozone government debt issues between 1999 and 2015, I find that governments increase long-term debt issues following periods of low aggregate Eurozone long-term debt issuance, and vice versa. This gap-filling behaviour is more pronounced for (1) less financially constrained and (2) higher rated governments. Using the ECB’s three-year LTRO in 2011-2012 as an event study, I find that core governments filled the supply gap of longer maturity debt, which resulted from peripheral governments accommodating banks’ short-term debt demand for “carry trades”. This gap-filling implies that governments act as macro-liquidity providers across maturities, thereby adding significant risk absorption capacity to government bond markets.
- JEL Code
- E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
E62 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook→Fiscal Policy
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
H63 : Public Economics→National Budget, Deficit, and Debt→Debt, Debt Management, Sovereign Debt