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Dawid Żochowski

Specialised Institutions & LSIs

Division: Specialised Institutions & LSIs 4
Current Position: Head of Section
Fields of interest: Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics,International Economics,Financial Economics
Email: [email protected]

Biography

Other current responsibilities: 2014-
International Banking Research Network; 2014-
American Economic Association
Education: 2015
Yale Program on Financial Stability, Yale School of Management; 2005
PhD in Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, 2005
Professional experience: 2018-2018
Adviser, Stress Test Modelling Division; 2014-2018
Principal Financial Stability Expert, Macro-Financial Linkages Division; 2013-2014
Senior Economist, Financial Research Division; 2010-2013
ECB Troika Financial Sector Team; 2007-2013
Senior Financial Stability Expert, Financial Stability Division; 2003-2006
Principal Economist, National Bank of Poland
Teaching experience: 2001-2011
Associate Professor, Warsaw School of Economics

ECB publications

7 February 2023

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2775

Negative rates, monetary policy transmission and cross-border lending via international financial centres

English

Abstract: We study the effects of negative interest rate policies (NIRP) on the transmission of monetary policy through cross-border lending. Using bank-level data from international financial centres – the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Ireland – we examine how NIRP in the economies where banks have their headquarters influences cross-border lending from financial-centre affiliates. We find that NIRP impairs the bank-lending channel for cross-border lending to non-bank sectors, especially for those banks that have only a weak deposit base in IFCs – and are thus relatively more exposed to NIRP in their headquarters. Using euro-area data, including bank-level data from France, we find that NIRP does not influence overall cross-border lending from banks’ headquarters’ economies, but NIRP does impair lending to financial sectors based in IFCs. This impairment is stronger for banks with a large deposit base in headquarter economies exposed to NIRP.
JEL Code: E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
F42 : International Economics→Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance→International Policy Coordination and Transmission
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

18 February 2020

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2373

Simulating fire sales in a system of banks and asset managers

English

Abstract: We develop an agent-based model of traditional banks and asset managers to investigate the contagion risk related to fire sales and balance sheet interactions. We take a structural approach to the price formation in fire sales as in Bluhm et al. (2014) and introduce a market clearing mechanism with endogenous formation of asset prices. We find that, first, banks which are active in both the interbank and securities markets may channel financial distress between the two markets. Second, while higher bank capital requirements decrease default risk and funding costs, they make it also more profitable to invest into less-liquid assets financed by interbank borrowing. Third, asset managers absorb small liquidity shocks, but they exacerbate contagion when their voluntary liquid buffers are fully utilised. Fourth, a system with larger and more interconnected agents is more prone to contagion risk stemming from funding shocks.
JEL Code: C6 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Mathematical Methods, Programming Models, Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G23 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Non-bank Financial Institutions, Financial Instruments, Institutional Investors

8 January 2020

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2356

Bank funding costs and solvency

English

Abstract: This paper investigates the relationship between bank funding costs and solvency for a large sample of euro area banks using two proprietary ECB datasets for both wholesale funding costs and deposit rates. In particular, the paper studies the relationship between bank solvency, on the one hand, and senior bond yields, term deposit rates and overnight deposit rates, on the other. The analysis finds a significant negative relationship between bank solvency and the different types of funding costs. It also shows that this relationship is non-linear, namely convex, for senior bond yields and term deposit rates. It also identifies a positive realistic solvency threshold beyond which the effect of an increase in solvency on senior bond yields becomes positive. The paper also finds that senior bond yields are more sensitive to a change in solvency than deposit rates. Among the deposit rates, the interest rates of the overnight deposits are the least sensitive. Banks' asset quality, profitability and liquidity seem to play only a minor role in driving funding costs while the ECB monetary policy stance, sovereign risk and financial markets uncertainty appear to be material drivers.
JEL Code: G15 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→International Financial Markets
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages

23 May 2019

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2285

Cross-border effects of prudential regulation: evidence from the euro area

English

Abstract: We analyse the cross-border propagation of prudential regulation in the euro area. Using the Prudential Instruments Database (Cerutti et al., 2017b) and a unique confidential database on balance sheets items of euro-area financial institutions we estimate panel models for 248 banks from 16 euro-area countries. We find that domestic banks reduce lending after the tightening of capital requirements in other countries, while they increase lending when loan-to-value (LTV) limits or reserve requirements are tightened abroad. We also find that foreign affiliates increase lending following the tightening of sector-specific capital buffers in the countries where their parent banks reside and that bank size and liquidity play a role in determining the magnitude of cross-border spillovers.
JEL Code: G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
F34 : International Economics→International Finance→International Lending and Debt Problems
F36 : International Economics→International Finance→Financial Aspects of Economic Integration
Network: Research Task Force (RTF)

24 May 2018

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE

A new financial stability risk index to predict the near-term risk of recession

Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2018

English

Abstract: The real economy repercussions of financial crises are the ultimate focus of financial stability monitoring and policymakers. By extending a standard set of financial stability indicators with indicators capturing spillover and contagion risks, this special feature proposes a financial stability risk index (FSRI) that has predictive power for the near-term risk of deep recessions. It is shown that the empirical performance of the index benefits from combining a large set of macro-financial indicators and, notably, that the information content of the spillover and contagion risk indicators is important.
JEL Code: G00 : Financial Economics→General→General

4 December 2017

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2114

The risk premium channel and long-term growth

English

Abstract: We study a quantitative DSGE model linking a state of the art asset pricing framework a la Kung and Schmid (2015) with a constraint on leverage as in Gertler and Kiyotaki a (2010). We show that a mere increase in the probability of firms being financially constrained leads to an increase in risk premia. Even for a small adverse shock to productivity a drop in asset valuation restrains firms from outside financing and by that induces a persistent low growth environment. In our framework a constraint on leverage induces countercyclical risk premia in equity markets even when it does not bind.
JEL Code: D53 : Microeconomics→General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium→Financial Markets
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G12 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Asset Pricing, Trading Volume, Bond Interest Rates

13 November 2017

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2109

The international bank lending channel of unconventional monetary policy

English

Abstract: We use a confidential euro area bank-level data set of close to 250 banks to assess outward and inward spillovers of unconventional monetary policies on bank lending. We find that euro area banks increase lending to the rest of the world in response to non-standard ECB monetary policy accommodation. We also find strong evidence that euro area banks increase lending to the domestic non-financial private sector in response to accommodative unconventional monetary policy measures in the US. Inward and outward spillovers are substantially stronger for euro area banks which are liquidity constrained and which rely more on internal capital markets. This suggests that bank-specific supply effects, stemming from banks’ increased ability to lend following a central bank balance sheet expansion, are a major driver of monetary policy spillovers, providing strong support to the existence of an international bank lending channel that prevails at the effective lower bound.
JEL Code: E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E52 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Monetary Policy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises

24 May 2017

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 2068

Knightian uncertainty and credit cycles

English

Abstract: The Great Recession has been characterised by the two stylized facts: the buildup of leverage in the household sector in the period preceding the recession and a protracted economic recovery that followed. We attempt to explain these two facts as an information friction, whereby agents are uncertain about a new state of the economy following a ﬁnancial innovation. To this end, we extend Boz and Mendoza (2014) by explicitly modelling the credit markets and by modifying the learning to an adaptive set-up. In our model the build-up of leverage and the collateral price cycles takes longer than in a stylized DSGE model with ﬁnancial frictions. The boom-bust cycles occur as rare events, with two systemic crises per century. Financial stability is achieved with an LTV-cap regulation which smooths the leverage cycles through quantity (higher equity participation requirement) and price (lower collateral value) eﬀects, as well as by providing an anchor in the learning process of agents.
JEL Code: G14 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Information and Market Efficiency, Event Studies, Insider Trading
G17 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Financial Forecasting and Simulation
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G32 : Financial Economics→Corporate Finance and Governance→Financing Policy, Financial Risk and Risk Management, Capital and Ownership Structure, Value of Firms, Goodwill
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

25 August 2016

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1943

When shadows grow longer: shadow banking with endogenous entry

English

Abstract: Why did the shadow banking sectors in the US and the euro area expand in the decade before the financial crisis and what are the implications for systemic risk and macro-prudential policy? This paper examines these issues with a model of the financial sector where the size of the shadow banking sector is endogenous. In the model, shadow banking is an alternative banking strategy which involves greater risk-taking at the expense of being exposed to "fundamental runs" on the funding side. When such runs occur, shadow banks liquidate their assets in a secondary market. Entry into shadow banking is profitable when traditional banks provide sufficient secondary market demand to prevent these liquidations from causing a fire-sale. During periods of stability, the shadow banking sector expands to an excessively large size that ferments systemic risk. Its collapse then triggers a fire-sale that renders traditional banks vulnerable to "liquidity runs". The prospect of liquidity runs undermines market discipline and increases the risk-taking incentives of traditional banks. Policy interventions aimed at alleviating the fire-sale fuel further expansion of the shadow banking sector. Financial stability is achieved with a Pigouvian tax on shadow bank profits.
JEL Code: E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G11 : Financial Economics→General Financial Markets→Portfolio Choice, Investment Decisions
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation

8 March 2016

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1888

The impact of bank capital on economic activity - evidence from a mixed-cross-section GVAR model

English

Abstract: We develop a Mixed-Cross-Section Global Vector Autoregressive (MCS-GVAR) model for the 28 EU economies and a sample of individual banking groups to study the propagation of bank capital shocks to the economy. We conduct various simulations with the model to assess how capital ratio shocks influence bank credit supply and aggregate demand. We distinguish between contractionary and expansionary deleveraging scenarios and confirm the intuitive result that only when banks choose to achieve higher capital ratios by shrinking their balance sheets would economic activity be at risk to contract. The model can be used to establish ranges of impact estimates for capital-related macroprudential policy measures, including counter-cyclical capital buffers, systemic risk buffers, G-SIB buffers, etc., also with a view to assessing the cross-country spillover effects of such policy measures. We highlight the importance for macroprudential policy makers to give clear guidance to banks as to how certain macroprudential policy measures should be implemented
JEL Code: C33 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models, Multiple Variables→Panel Data Models, Spatio-temporal Models
E51 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Money Supply, Credit, Money Multipliers
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies

28 May 2015

FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW - ARTICLE

A Framework for Analysing and Assessing Cross-Border Spillovers from Macroprudential Policies

Financial Stability Review Issue 1, 2015

English

Abstract: Macro-prudential measures implemented in individual Member States may have cross-border or cross-sectoral repercussions. This special feature discusses cross-border spillover channels. To limit negative spillover effects, macro-prudential instruments should be applied consistently across countries, and reciprocity agreements must be applied transparently.
JEL Code: G00 : Financial Economics→General→General

22 October 2014

WORKING PAPER SERIES - No. 1737

Financial fragility of euro area households

English

Abstract: We propose a novel framework to identify distressed households by taking account of both the solvency and the liquidity situation of an individual household. Using the data from the Household Finance and Consumption Survey and the country-level data on non-performing loans we calibrate our metric of distress and estimate stress-test elasticities in response to an interest rate shock, an income shock and a house price shock. We find that, albeit euro area households are relatively resilient as a whole, there are large discrepancies in the impact of macroeconomic shocks across countries. Furthermore, while losses given default as calculated using our framework are low, they are sensitive to house prices changes. Hence, any factors hindering the seizure of the collateral or lowering its value, such as inefficient legal systems, moratoria on foreclosures or bottlenecks in judicial procedures may significantly increase losses facing banks. Finally, we demonstrate that our framework could be used for macroprudential purposes, in particular for the calibration of country level loan-to-value ratio caps.
JEL Code: D10 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→General
D14 : Microeconomics→Household Behavior and Family Economics→Household Saving; Personal Finance
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
Network: Household Finance and Consumption Network (HFCN)

11 October 2013

OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES - No. 152

A macro stress testing framework for assessing systemic risks in the banking sector

English

Abstract: The use of macro stress tests to assess bank solvency has developed rapidly over the past few years. This development was reinforced by the financial crisis, which resulted in substantial losses for banks and created general uncertainty about the banking sector's loss-bearing capacity. Macro stress testing has proved a useful instrument to help identify potential vulnerabilities within the banking sector and to gauge its resilience to adverse developments. To support its contribution to safeguarding financial stability and its financial sector-related work in the context of EU/IMF Financial Assistance Programmes, and looking ahead to the establishment of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the ECB has developed a top-down macro stress testing framework that is used regularly for forward-looking bank solvency assessments. This paper comprehensively presents the main features of this framework and illustrates how it can be employed for various policy analysis purposes.
JEL Code: C53 : Mathematical and Quantitative Methods→Econometric Modeling→Forecasting and Prediction Methods, Simulation Methods
D85 : Microeconomics→Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty→Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
E37 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E44 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
E47 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Money and Interest Rates→Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
E58 : Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics→Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit→Central Banks and Their Policies
G01 : Financial Economics→General→Financial Crises
G21 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Banks, Depository Institutions, Micro Finance Institutions, Mortgages
G28 : Financial Economics→Financial Institutions and Services→Government Policy and Regulation